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As the United States and its NATO allies stood on the brink of war against
Yugoslavia in the waning days of March, lawyers rose to sudden prominence in
the high councils of the alliance. Everyone understood that an attack would
violate a fundamental precept of international law, and set a new precedent for
the use of military force.
For the first time, Western nations would be intervening militarily against an
independent nation not because it posed a direct threat to neighbors, but
because it persecuted an ethnic minority within its own borders. In striking
Belgrade, NATO would bypass the United Nations and ignore the fundamental
principles of sovereignty and the "Great Powers" consensus that are at the core
of the United Nations charter.
In a March 23 letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., White House
National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger justified going to war on
the grounds that Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic was a repeat offender
under international law and a direct threat to the stability of the region. "It
is important to note that Serbian President Milosevic initiated an aggressive
war against the independent nation of Croatia in 1991; against the independent
nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992; and is currently engaged in widespread
repression of Kosovo, whose constitutional guarantees of autonomy he
unilaterally abrogated in 1989," wrote Berger. "Arguments based on Serbian
'sovereignty' are undercut by this history."
Whatever the merit of its moral underpinnings, NATO's war with Yugoslavia
crossed an important threshold in international law. The sanctity of national
sovereignty has largely governed nation-state relations for the past
half-century. The Allies specifically cited sovereignty as they fought the wars
of aggression that haunted the first half of the 20th century, in their hope of
breaking the historic pattern in which strong nations exploited the weak. And
interventions on behalf of ethnic minorities don't have an entirely noble
history. Adolf Hitler justified his seizure of the Sudetenland in
Czechoslovakia by claiming persecution of ethnic Germans there.
The visceral opposition to the Kosovo conflict on the part of Russia, China,
and India revealed just how uncomfortable some nations still are with the
apparent abandonment of the principle of sovereignty, especially during a
period of unrivaled U.S. military power. They point to the U.N. charter, which
enshrines and protects sovereignty unless the five Great Powers on the Security
Council agree to breach it.
Donald Kagan, a professor of history at Yale University, sees the Kosovo
conflict as an important marker. "That the United States and its allies were
willing to intervene militarily in what were the agreed borders of a sovereign
state was unusual and very rare, and it raises the question of, where do we go
from here," said Kagan. "I see it as part of the effort, since the end of the
Cold War, to establish new rules for the international order that reduce the
chance for war. I think NATO was saying sovereignty has limits, and the world
will not sit by idly again and watch while a Hitler or Mao murders millions. At
the same time, we shouldn't erode the principle of sovereignty lightly.
Nation-states have been, are now, and will remain fundamental building blocks
of international order."
The establishment of the nation-state as a building block of the international
system--including each country's independence and its primacy over its
citizenry that are at the heart of sovereignty--dates back to the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, which ended Europe's bloody Thirty Years' War. The
Westphalian system respected the territorial integrity of each nation-state,
even one that had lost a war, and held that states may not interfere in the
internal affairs of other states. While imperialist powers showed little
compunction about intervening in "less-civilized" nations, such actions were
seen among the major powers as an abrogation of accepted international norms.
After the trauma of World War II, the principle of sovereignty was codified in
the U.N. charter. States would be sanctioned for acts of force against other
states unless in self- defense, but within their borders, they were free to
act. In the U.N. conventions on genocide and torture, however, nations also
assumed a legal obligation to uphold basic human rights. And Chapter VII of the
U.N. charter endorses collective action to counter "threats to international
peace and security," such as internal actions that might cause massive refugee
flows that could destabilize neighboring countries. In truth, as with most
founding documents, the U.N. charter is subject to interpretation.
"What's happened is that the Chapter VII provisions of the U.N. charter have
been interpreted more and more broadly in recent years to justify interventions
in places like Somalia and Kosovo," said Stephen Garrett, a professor at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. "There are also
contradictions between the early parts of the U.N. charter that talk about
nation-state rights, and those sections which refer to the duty of the
international community to uphold human rights. There's definite tension and
ambiguity there."
Giving veto power to each of the five permanent Security Council members--the
United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China--was the U.N. founders'
way of precluding international action in the absence of Great Power consensus.
And it worked; but it largely kept the United Nations from intervening in
conflicts during the Cold War. All of that changed when the East-West standoff
ended, and U.S. leaders saw an opportunity to use the collective will of the
international community to turn back nation-state aggression by Iraq over
Kuwait. New World Order "The United Nations had been set up to deal with one of
the great scourges of mankind, which was nation-state aggression, but the Cold
War had derailed its ability to deal with the problem," said Brent Scowcroft,
former national security adviser to President George Bush. "In 1991, we
suddenly saw a new vista where consensus was possible within the U.N. to
counter nation- state aggression. That was the new world order we were talking
about. What we didn't perceive was the extent to which conflicts of the 1990s
would be about civil wars, internal disputes, and the breakup of countries."
In attempting to cope with humanitarian disaster and instability provoked by
internal conflict in places like Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, the United
States and its allies found themselves subtly reinterpreting the concepts of
nation-state sovereignty and intervention. And in each case, the United Nations
gave its blessing to international intervention. The process culminated in the
Kosovo conflict, when NATO found itself confronting massive "ethnic cleansing"
and regional destabilization in Europe growing out of a conflict on which a
consensus among the Great Powers was impossible. NATO decided that national and
humanitarian interests outweighed sovereignty and even U.N. collectivism.
"NATO was faced with a pragmatic question of whether the principle of
sovereignty required it to sit on the sidelines of a humanitarian tragedy that
was destabilizing the region, and which could possibly bring NATO partners
Greece and Turkey into conflict," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, a White House
national security adviser in the Carter Administration and senior analyst at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "I would argue that was too
costly a price to pay for the principle of sovereignty."
In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, a number of prominent leaders have called
for an international review of the definition of a "just war," and a rewriting
of the U.N. charter to facilitate humanitarian interventions.
"There is an emerging international law that countries cannot hide behind
sovereignty and abuse people without expecting the rest of the world to do
something about it," Kofi Annan, U.N. secretary-general, said in a May 22
speech in Stockholm, Sweden. Former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana echoes
Annan's views: "We're moving into a system of international relations in which
human rights, rights of minorities every day, are much more important. More
important even than sovereignty."
But there is danger in consigning sovereignty to the history books. Weakening
the sanctity of borders could undermine the international norms that have kept
naked state-on-state aggression largely at bay in recent decades. Nations
should also be wary of announcing new international principles that they lack
the will to defend. On the other hand, if even a few architects of future
genocide and "ethnic cleansing" feel, as a result of Kosovo, less certain of
international indifference, then the war may have established a precedent worth
fighting for.
"By bypassing the United Nations and disregarding the principle of sovereignty
because of Serbia's internal treatment of its own people, I think NATO's
actions in the Kosovo conflict do represent a significant paradigm shift," said
Garrett of the Monterey Institute. "That doesn't mean we're going to see lots
of similar humanitarian interventions, or interventions in Great Powers such as
China and Russia. However, the days of absolute sovereignty--when governments
could abuse their own people with total impunity--are gone forever."
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Copyright 2000 The National Journal, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Reprinted with permission.
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