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This is one of those unique moments in history when the personality and
political behavior of one key political actor are of determinative
significance. The answers to many of the key questions with which this
committee is grappling depend upon a clear understanding of the motivations,
perceptions and decisionmaking of Saddam Hussein. To provide a framework for
this complex political leader, a comprehensive political psychology profile has
been developed.
Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, has been characterized as "the madman of the
Middle East." This pejorative diagnosis is not only inaccurate but is also
dangerous. Consigning Saddam to the realm of madness can mislead decisionmakers
into believing he is unpredictable when in fact he is not. An examination of
the record of Saddam Hussein's leadership of Iraq for the past twenty two years
reveals a judicious political calculator, who is by no means irrational, but is
dangerous to the extreme.
Saddam Hussein, "the great struggler," has explained the extremity of his
actions as President of Iraq as necessary to achieve "subjective immunity"
against foreign plots and influences. All actions of the revolution are
justified by the "exceptionalism of revolutionary needs." In fact, an
examination of Saddam Hussein's life and career reveals this is but the
ideological rationalization for a lifelong pattern: all actions are justified
if they are in the service of furthering Saddam Hussein's needs and
ambitions.
Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 to a poor peasant family near Tikrit in central
Iraq. His father died before he was born, and in keeping with tradition, a
paternal uncle married his mother. From early years on, Saddam, whose name
means "the fighter who stands steadfast," charted his own course and would not
accept limits. When Saddam was only 10, he was impressed by a visit from his
cousin who knew how to read and write. He confronted his family with his wish
to become educated, and when they turned him down, he left his home in the
middle of the night, making his way to the home of his maternal uncle Kairallah
in Tikrit.
Kairallah was to become not only Saddam's father figure but his political
mentor as well. Kairallah had fought against Great Britain in the Iraqi
uprising of 1941 and had spent five years in prison for his nationalist
agitation. He filled the impressionable young boy's head with tales of his
heroic relatives -- his great grandfather and two great uncles -- who gave
their lives for the cause of Iraqi nationalism while fighting foreign invaders.
Kairallah, who was later to become governor of Baghdad, shaped young Hussein's
world view, imbuing him with a hatred of foreigners. In 1981, Saddam
republished a pamphlet written by his uncle entitled "Three Whom God Should Not
Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies."
Kairallah tutored his young charge in his view of Arab history and the ideology
of nationalism and the Ba'th party. Founded in 1940, the Ba'th party envisaged
the creation of a new Arab nation defeating the colonialist and imperialist
powers and achieving Arab independence, unity and socialism. Ba'th ideology,
as conceptualized by its intellectual founding father Michel Aflaq, focused on
the history of oppression and division of the Arab world, first at the hands
of the Ottomans, then the Western mandates, then the monarchies ruled by
Western interests, and finally the establishment of the Zionist entity.
Inspired by his uncle's tales of heroism in the service of the Arab nation,
Saddam has been consumed by dreams of glory since his earliest days. He
identifies himself with Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylonia who conquered
Jerusalem (586 B.C.) and Saladin who regained Jerusalem in 1187 by defeating
the Crusaders.
Saddam was steeped in Arab history and Ba'thist ideology when he traveled with
his uncle to Baghdad to pursue his secondary education. The schools were a
hotbed of Arab nationalism which confirmed his political leanings. In 1952,
when he was 15, Nasser led the Free officer's revolution in Egypt and became a
hero to young Saddam and his peers. Nasser, as the activist leader of
Pan-Arabism, became an idealized model for Saddam. From Nasser's model he
learned that only by outrageously confronting imperialist powers could Arab
nationalism be freed from Western shackles.
At age 20, inspired by Nasser, Saddam joined the Arab Ba'th socialist Party in
Iraq and quickly impressed party officials with his dedication. Two years
later, in 1956, apparently emulating Nasser, Iraqi Army General Qassem led a
coup which ousted the monarchy. But unlike Nasser, Qassem did not pursue the
path of socialism and turned against the Ba'th party. The 22 year old Saddam
was called to Ba'th party headquarters and given the mission to lead a five man
team to assassinate Qassem. The mission failed, reportedly because of a
crucial error in judgment by Saddam. Saddam's escape to Syria, first by
horseback and then by swimming a river, has achieved mythic status in Iraqi
history. Saddam went to Egypt during this period of exile to study law, rising
to leadership ranks in the Egyptian Ba'th Party. He returned to Iraq after
1963 when Qassem was ousted by the Ba'ths and was elected to the National
Command. Michel Aflaq, the ideological father of the Ba'th party, admired
young Hussein, declaring the Iraqi Ba'th party the finest in the world and
designating Saddam Hussein as his successor.
Envious of his fellow Ba'thist Hafez al-Assad's success in taking control of
Syria, Hussein confronted the new Syrian Ba'th leadership in a party meeting in
Iraq in 1966. The split and rivalry persists to this day, for there can be
only one supreme Arab nationalist leader, and destiny has inscribed his name as
Saddam Hussein.
Hussein mounted a successful coup in 1968 with the crucial secret assistance of
military intelligence chief Abdul Rassaz al Nayef. In gratitude for services
rendered, within two weeks Hussein had arranged for the capture and exile of
Nayef, and subsequently ordered his assassination.
This act was a paradigm for the manner in which Saddam has rewarded loyalty and
adhered to commitments throughout his career. Commitments and loyalty are
matter of circumstance, and circumstances change. If an individual, or a
nation, is perceived as an impediment or a threat, no matter how loyal in the
past, that individual or nation will be eliminated violently without a backward
glance, and the action will be justified by "the exceptionalism of
revolutionary needs."
Nothing must be permitted to stand in "the great struggler's" messianic path as
he pursues his (and Iraq's) revolutionary destiny, as exemplified by this
extract from Saddam Hussein's remarkable "Victory Day" message of 6 August
This is the only way to deal with these despicable Croesuses who relished
possession to destroy devotion...who were guided by the foreigner instead of
being guided by virtuous standards, principles of pan-Arabism, and the creed of
humanitarianism....The second of August...is the legitimate newborn child of
the struggle, patience and perseverance of the Kuwaiti people, which was
crowned by revolutionary action on that immortal day. The newborn child was
born of a legitimate father and an immaculate mother. Greetings to the makers
of the second of August whose efforts God has blessed. They have achieved
one of the brightest, most promising and most principled national and pan-Arab
acts.
Two August has come as a very violent response to the harm that the foreigner
had wanted to perpetrate against Iraq and the nation. The Croesus of Kuwait
and his aides became the obedient, humiliated and treacherous dependents of
that foreigner...What took place on 2 August was inevitable so that death might
not prevail over life, so that those who were capable of ascending to the
peak would not be brought down to the abysmal precipice, so that corruption
and remoteness from God would not spread to the majority...Honor will be kept
in Mesopotamia so that Iraq will be the pride of the Arabs, their protector,
and their model of noble values.
Hussein's practice of revolutionary opportunism has another important
characteristic. Just as previous commitments must not be permitted to stand in
the way of Saddam's messianic path, neither should one persist in a particular
course of action if it proves to be counter-productive for him and his nation.
When he pursues a course of action, he pursues it fully, and if he meets
initial resistance, he will struggle all the harder, convinced of the
correctness of his judgments. But if circumstances demonstrated that he
miscalculated, he is capable of reversing his course. In these circumstances
he does not acknowledge he has erred, but rather views himself as adapting
flexibly to a dynamic situation...
The labels "madman of the Middle East" and "megalomaniac" are often affixed to
Saddam, but in fact there is no evidence that he is suffering from a psychotic
disorder. He is not impulsive, only acts after judicious consideration, and
can be extremely patient, indeed uses time as a weapon.
While he is psychologically in touch with reality, he is often politically out
of touch with reality. Saddam's world view is narrow and distorted, and he has
scant experience out of the Arab world. His only sustained experience with
non-Arabs was with his Soviet military advisors and he reportedly had one brief
trip to France in 1976. Moreover, he is surrounded by sycophants, who are
cowed by Saddam's well founded reputation for brutality and are afraid to
contradict him. He has ruthlessly eliminated perceived threats to his power and
equates criticism with disloyalty. At one time early in his presidency, he
identified 500 Communist party members for execution and had his senior
officials form the execution squads. In 1979, when he fully assumed the reins
of Iraqi leadership, one of his first acts was to execute twenty-one senior
officials whose loyalty he questioned. In 1982, when the war with Iran was
going very badly for Iraq and Saddam wished to terminate hostilities, Khomeini,
who was personally fixated on Saddam, insisted there could be no peace until
Saddam was removed from power. At a cabinet meeting, Saddam asked his
ministers to candidly give their advice, and the Minister of Health suggested
Saddam temporarily step down, to resume the presidency after peace had been
established. Saddam reportedly thanked him for his candor and ordered his
arrest. His wife pled for her husband's return. The next day, Saddam returned
her husband's body to her in a black canvas bag, chopped into pieces. This
powerfully concentrated the attention of the other ministers who were unanimous
in their insistence that Saddam remain in power. Thus he is deprived of the
check of wise counsel from his leadership circle. This combination of limited
international perspective and a sycophantic leadership circle has led him to
miscalculate in the past.
Saddam's pursuit of power for himself and Iraq is boundless. In fact, in his
mind, the destiny of Saddam and Iraq are one and indistinguishable. His exalted
self concept is fused with his Ba'thist political ideology. Ba'thist dreams
will be realized when the Arab nation is unified under one strong leader. In
Saddam's mind, he is destined for that role.
In pursuit of his messianic dreams, there is no evidence he is constrained by
conscience; his only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein. In pursuing his goals,
Saddam uses aggression instrumentally. He uses whatever force is necessary,
and will, if he deems it expedient, go to extremes of violence, including the
use of weapons of mass destruction. His unconstrained aggression is
instrumental in pursuing his goals, but it is at the same time defensive
aggression, for his grandiose façade masks underlying insecurity. While
Hussein is not psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orientation. He is ready
for retaliation and, not without reason, sees himself as surrounded by enemies.
But he ignores his role in creating those enemies, and righteously threatens
his targets. The conspiracy theories he spins are not merely for popular
consumption in the Arab world, but genuinely reflect his paranoid mindset. He
is convinced that the United States, Israel and Iran have been in league for
the purpose of eliminating him, and finds a persuasive chain of evidence for
this conclusion. His minister of information, Latif Hassif Jasin, who is
responsible for propaganda and public statements, probably helps reinforce
Saddam's paranoid disposition and in a sense is the implementer of his
paranoia.
It is this political personality constellation--messianic ambition for
unlimited power, absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression, and a
paranoid outlook--which make Saddam so dangerous. Conceptualized as malignant
narcissism, this is the personality configuration of the destructive
charismatic who unifies and rallies his downtrodden supporters by blaming
outside enemies. While Saddam is not charismatic, this psychological stance is
the basis of Saddam's particular appeal to the Palestinians who see him as a
strongman who shares their intense anti-Zionism and will champion their
cause.
Saddam Hussein genuinely sees himself as one of the great leaders of history,
ranking himself with Nasser, Castro, Tito, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong, each of
whom he admires for adapting socialism to his environment, free of foreign
domination. Saddam sees himself as transforming his society. He believes
youth must be "fashioned" to "safeguard the future" and that Iraqi children
must be transformed into a "radiating light that will expel" traditional family
backwardness. Like Mao, Saddam has encouraged youth to inform on their
parents' anti-revolutionary activity. As God-like status was ascribed to Mao,
and giant pictures and statues of him were placed throughout China, so too
giant pictures and statues of Saddam abound in Iraq. Asked about this cult of
personality, Saddam shrugs and says he "cannot help it if that is what they
want to do."
Saddam Hussein is so consumed with his messianic mission that he probably
overreads the degree of his support in the rest of the Arab world. He
psychologically assumes that many in the Arab world, especially the
downtrodden, share his views and see him as their hero. He was probably
genuinely surprised at the nearly unanimous condemnation of his invasion of
Kuwait. He probably has to a degree persuaded himself of his oft repeated
assertion that the United Nations is controlled by the United States, denying
the degree of international disapproval.
It is not by accident that Saddam Hussein has survived for more than two
decades as his nation's preeminent leader in this tumultuous part of the world.
While he is driven by dreams of glory, and his political perspective is narrow
and distorted, he is a shrewd tactician who has a sense of patience. Able to
justify extremes of aggression on the basis of revolutionary needs, if the
aggression is counterproductive, he has shown a pattern of reversing his course
when he has miscalculated, waiting until a later day to achieve his
revolutionary destiny. His drive for power is not diminished by these
reversals, but only deflected.
Saddam Hussein is a ruthless political calculator who will go to whatever
lengths are necessary to achieve his goals. But his survival in power-with his
dignity intact-is his highest priority. Saddam has recently been characterized
by Soviet Foreign Minister Primakov and others as suffering from a "Masada
complex", preferring a martyr's death to yielding. This is assuredly
not the case, for Saddam has no wish to be a martyr, and survival is his
number one priority. A self-proclaimed revolutionary pragmatist, he does not
wish a conflict in which Iraq will be grievously damaged and his stature as a
leader destroyed...
Now that he is at the very center of international attention, his appetite for
glory has been stimulated all the more. The glory-seeking Saddam will not
easily yield the spotlight of international attention. He wants to remain on
center stage, but not at the expense of his power and his prestige. Saddam
will only withdraw if he calculates that he can do so with his power and his
honor intact and that the drama in which he is starring will continue.
Honor and reputation must be interpreted in an Arab context. Saddam has
already achieved considerable honor in the eyes of the Arab masses for having
the courage to stand up to the West. It should be remembered that even though
Egypt militarily lost the 1973 war with Israel, Sadat became a hero to the Arab
world for his willingness to attack--and initially force back--the previously
invincible forces of Israel. Qadhafi mounted an air attack when the United
States crossed the so-called "line of death." Even though his jets were
destroyed in the ensuing conflict, Qadhafi's status was raised in the Arab
world. Indeed, he thanked the United States for making him a hero. Thus
Saddam can find honor in the present situation. His past history reveals a
remarkable capacity to find face saving justification when reversing his course
in very difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, it is important not to insist
on total capitulation and humiliation, for this could drive Saddam into a
corner and make it impossible for him to reverse his course. He will only
withdraw from Kuwait if he believes he can survive with his power and his
dignity intact.
By the same token, he will only reverse his present course if his power and
reputation are threatened. This requires a posture of strength, firmness and
clarity of purpose by a unified civilized world, demonstrably willing to use
force if necessary. The only language Saddam Hussein understands is the
language of power. Without this demonstrable willingness to use force, even if
the sanctions are biting deeply, Saddam is quite capable of putting his
population through a sustained period of hardship, as he has in the past. It
is crucial to demonstrate unequivocally to Saddam Hussein that unless he
withdraws, his career as a world class political actor will be ended. The
recent announcement of a major escalation of the force level was presumably
designed to drive the message home. The UN resolution authorizing the use of
force unless Iraq withdraws by January 15 is a particularly powerful message
because of the large majority supporting the resolution.
The message almost certainly has been received. In the wake of the
announcement of the increase of force level, Saddam intensified his request for
"deep negations", seeking a way out in which he can preserve his power and his
reputation. That President Bush has signaled his willingness to send Secretary
Baker to meet one-on-one with Saddam is an extremely important step. In the
interim, the shrewdly manipulative Saddam will continue to attempt to divide
the international coalition and to exploit the foreign hostages.
Considering himself a revolutionary pragmatist, Saddam is at heart a survivor.
If in response to the unified demonstration of strength and resolve he does
retreat and reverse his course, this will only be a temporary deflection of his
unbounded drive for power. It is a certainty that he will return at a later
date, stronger than ever, unless firm measures are taken to contain him. This
underlines the importance of strategic planning beyond the immediate crisis,
especially considering his progress toward acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability. If blocked in his overt aggression, he can be expected to pursue
his goals covertly through intensified support of terrorism.
Saddam will not go down to the last flaming bunker if he has a way out, but he
can be extremely dangerous and will stop at nothing if he is backed into a
corner. If he believes his very survival as a world class political actor is
threatened, Saddam can respond with unrestrained aggression, using whatever
weapons and resources are out his disposal, in what would surely be a tragic
and bloody final act.
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