So, after Sept. 11, do you see missile defense playing a
significant role in the Bush foreign policy? And if it is as much about
power-projection as about defense, how does that sit in terms of domestic
politics? If that rationale becomes part of the sales pitch for it, would that
make it a harder sell?
I think missile defense
remains a very high priority for this administration. You can see that by the
amount of money that continues to be spent on missile defense. The
administration has not reduced the amount that's sought for missile defense
since Sept. 11. And they've planned to have a very rudimentary capability in place
by the 2004 presidential election, as further indication that they want to be
able to claim significant progress in this area at the end of Bush's first
term.
There's also, still, the more
traditional rationale of having a missile defense system just for defensive
purposes. I mean, that hasn't
disappeared. But I don't think any
of these arguments really have gotten much public attention, with the larger
public, because there just hasn't been a very big national debate about missile
defense.
The administration was able
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty with astonishingly little uproar, domestically
or abroad, it turned out. I say
astonishing because six or twelve months before, people had been warning about
dire consequences from such a move. And by the time the moment came, you know, post-Sept. 11, it looked a
little different and the focus of attention was elsewhere. I see no sign of the public getting
worked up about missile defense enough to really trigger a very lively, broad
debate about just where the administration is going with this program. At least not so long as the focus
remains on combating terrorists and weapons of mass destruction around the
world. ...
You would see missile defense
becoming a big issue if, for instance, the United States were actually attacked
by a ballistic missile. I think an
event like that would actually galvanize public support very much in favor of
missile defense.
And how likely is that to happen?
Well, at this point, it's
very unlikely that we would be attacked by a long-range missile. I mean, there's certainly a prospect of
somehow a shorter-range missile getting into position, being launched -- a ballistic missile, or even a
cruise missile.
Is the short-range threat seen as more immediate, more urgent?
There's no debate over the
need to protect U.S. troops in the field against what are called
"theater" ballistic missiles. There's bipartisan support for that. We saw it in the Gulf War in 1991 with the Iraqi Scud
missile attacks. And that's a very
real threat. And everybody's in
agreement that we need better defenses against those kinds of battlefield
weapons. The argument still, among
those who are still interested in the debate, is over whether all that we're
spending on development of a national system against intercontinental-range
weapons is really all that urgent, and worth the cost.
And, you know, while a
missile attack on the United States would certainly shift the whole country
four-square behind development of a national missile defense system, I think
conversely, a continued difficulty in developing an effective defense after
more and more billions are spent in the next few years, could again prompt
debate and argument over whether we're just pouring more national resources
down a black hole. But I don't think that kind of debate's likely to come in
the next year or two. The Bush administration now does have some freedom of
action, not a blank check, but a check to see if its approach can work.
I don't think the stars have
ever been better aligned in this country in favor of pursuing a national
missile defense than right now. You've got the ABM Treaty constraints removed, you have a president who
has made this a high priority, you have a Congress willing to approve the
money. There have been some technological gains with this hit-to-kill
technology, using a missile to hit a speeding missile. In the long up-and-down
history of missile defense, there have never been as many factors lined up in
favor of actually achieving some kind of missile defense than there are
now.
So, if they can't do it now,
if they can't do it in the next few years -- I don't know, I've heard some
people involved in the program say, "They'll probably never be able to do
it." So, we'll see.
So if the lights are green
and, as you say, the stars are aligned, then this is the moment of truth, in a
way? In other words, when the next decision about deployment comes along, the
next self-imposed deadline, which is 2004, it may get more interesting because
the stakes are higher?
Much of the ideological
argument has been diffused now -- the focus of the debate will be on issues
like performance and cost in the months and few years to come. So, yes, at some
point we're going to -- this administration seems determined to -- actually get
to a deployment decision. And at some point we're going to get locked into a
technology, a base technology, and build something. And that will require an even bigger investment. They've designed the system in a way
that they say they're going to be constantly improving it and updating it, and
so on. But when you start pouring
concrete and erecting things on it, you know, then the expense becomes even
more significant.
We hear how passionate the
proponents of missile defense are about this, that for those on the right it's
a "theology," and so on. But what about the critics? As a reporter who's covered this for a long
time, what is your perspective on the critics? Why are they so passionate about
this issue?
Well, there are a number of
factors. First, you have to consider what's at stake. For much of the Cold War,
the United States held to a doctrine that said the best defense was not really
to erect a defense, but to have this mutual balance of terror. And the thinking
was that if one side erected a defense, it would just spur the other side to
increase their offensive arsenals. And this doctrine of deterrence and
"mutual assured destruction" is largely credited with keeping the
peace throughout the Cold War. So the argument from some missile defense
critics is, "You tamper with what has worked at your own peril. Why change now?" That's one argument.
Another argument is a
scientific one. There's a real question about whether this stuff could ever
really work. And if you feel it's just such a long-shot, you know, why spend so
much money on trying to make it work? There's the whole affordability argument,
tradeoffs. What are we
sacrificing? And this is part of the concern of the military chiefs. It would
be nice to have a missile defense, but there are other things -- military
modernization and transformation is expensive -- and the money that's going to
missile defense means we don't have as much money as we'd like to speed the
transformation of other military forces.
But beyond these arguments
over doctrine, scientific feasibility, and fiscal affordability, there is a
larger factor about missile defense that has made it a kind of litmus test for
the political right and left in this country. It's taken on a kind of
transcendent, symbolic significance over where one stands on the issue of how
best to keep America militarily strong -- whether through arms advances or arms
accords, whether through military buildups or diplomatic building blocks. And
seen in this light, the issue of missile defense isn't really just about
missile defense; it's about the best way to sustain American military
prominence.
And so in this sense, the
fight over missile defense has taken on an almost theological quality. In fact,
the fervor of the debate sometimes reflects a kind of religious intensity. You
hear it in the terminology that has been used. You have critics of missile
defense talking about the "sanctity" of the ABM Treaty, and you have
proponents of missile defense talking about the "morality" of
building a national anti-missile shield.
And I think there's one other
factor, too, that's important here. The quest for some kind of weapon that
would make the United States invulnerable taps into a kind of universal and
timeless yearning. It goes back to
ancient days -- Zeus had his Aegis cloak. And that striving for invulnerability is a very human kind of
thing. But there's also something
about the missile defense debate that makes it a distinctly American story. For
a very long time, being bordered by these two great oceans, we felt distant and
protected against the whims of far-off dictators. But with the advent of the intercontinental ballistic
missile, an historical sense of invulnerability has been challenged. And so
there is, I think, a desire by proponents of missile defense to somehow restore
the United States to that vanished sense of invulnerability.
And on Sept. 11, it may
not have been a missile that hit us, but it certainly added to that sense of
vulnerability?
Yes, it heightened the sense
of vulnerability. In that sense
Sept. 11 does serve the Bush administration's argument for all kinds of
weapons. We'd better protect Americans against all threats, some of which may
seem very remote. Because the
notion of commercial airliners being hijacked and flown into American symbols
of power had seemed about as remote prior to Sept. 11 as a long-range missile
attack by North Korea.
| 
