First Deputy Director of the Soviet biological weapons program Biopreparat,1988-1992. He defected in 1992. In this interview he details the massive scale of the Soviets' secret program which went on for almost two decades, including how tons of deadly agents were stockpiled to be used in special warheads targeted at American cities. He also discusses the importance of the smallpox virus in the Soviet program.

U.S. Secretary of State from 1989 - 1992, discusses how the U.S. discovered the secret Soviet program, whether Soviet leaders knew about it, and how U.S. today should deal with lingering questions about possible continuing offensive work.

U.S. Secretary of Defense, gives an overview of the bio-weapons threat and the measures being taken for U.S. bio-defenses.

Senior Advisor for Politico-Military Warning Issues, Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the U.S. State Department discusses the Soviets' deception and how the West was fooled.

Served on Britain's Defense Intelligence Staff, 1987-1996. A member of the Western team that in 1991 inspected covert Soviet biological warfare facilities, he details what it was like going inside the vast, secret Biopreparat research complex.

Clinical Investigator in the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases from 1987 to 1992. He also was a member of the 1991 Western inspection team and went into Vector, a huge complex of Soviet laboratories in western Siberia. He discusses what it was like to actually walk through the vast facilities and deal with the Soviet hosts. He also outlines the long-term effects of the Soviets' secret bio-weapons program.

A molecular biologist who has written extensively about biological agents. He summarizes the status of the U.S. biological warfare program prior to President Nixon's decision to end it in1969, the concerns today about biological weaponry and, in particular, the continuing questions about three Russian military labs.

State Epidemiologist at the Minnesota Department of Health is one of the country's most out-spoken advocates of developing national emergency preparedness for bio-weapon attacks. He gives a rundown of bio-agents and what they can do, outlines a scenario whereby smallpox is easily released in a major airport with horrifying consequences, and analyzes the serious weaknesses in the U.S. emergency response system.

Director of the CIA from 1993-1995. He evaluates the biological terrorism threat and what it would take to adequately protect the U.S.