Announcer: Ladies and gentlemen, good evening and welcome to this special program on Switzerland and the war. The title, "Switzerland, Neutral or Cowardly?" needs to be explained.

During the war, from 1939 to 1945, a slogan on the billboards read "Switzerland, neutral but not cowardly." For months, accusations, questioning, recall of certain historical studies, vexing problems, questions, incertitude stimulated by all these events and polemics have encouraged us to take up this slogan again, but in an interrogative form as the title of our program: "Switzerland, Neutral or Cowardly?"

[Is] "Switzerland, Neutral or Cowardly?" -- when they engage in business with Germany; when they become the bankers for the Reich; when they turn away Jews by the thousands or, when they think up the national reduction. These are the most significant points in the controversy which has been all over the news the last several months.

It is precisely with these questions that we shall deal this evening, particularly with the public. We received over 200 telephone calls giving us your questions, impressions, remarks, feelings, not counting the many letters that we received. I would like to thank you all.

To attempt to answer your questions as well as those of the television audience, we have brought together historians who have worked on these topics for years. We have also gathered together a number of men and women who are involved in politics, journalists, and of particular note permit me to mention Mr. Grevelle Janner, who is a British member of Parliament and Vice-President of the World Jewish Congress, and Mr. Jean -Pierre Roth who is Vice President of the Banque Nationale.

Lastly, we will ask what the image of Switzerland has become in the world, an image which seems much degraded by all these discussions, and what measures should be taken to correct this image. For this purpose we have invited two guests from the United States.

To begin this debate, each time with different individuals, we shall give you a brief visual reminder of all the questioning to which Switzerland has been subject since last spring, yes, it began then, to recall an image...

Springtime: 1995: fifty years after the Shoah, The Israeli press grabs hold of the rumor that the Swiss have plundered the victims of the Holocaust. Seven billion francs still remained in Swiss banks. The polemic had begun... The image of Swiss banks is seriously threatened. Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress and Avraham Burg, President of the Jewish Agency, are received by the banks. American subsidiaries of Swiss banks could experience retaliatory measures. In the United States, Senator Alfonse d'Amato announces the American Senate is going to undertake an investigation. Swiss banks have not yet reacted, draped in their arrogance...

Jewish organizations exhume archives and claim to have uncovered the existence of more than 100,000 compromising pieces of evidence. "If our conflict with the Swiss banks were to last ten years, we would still have enough information to be able to publish about it every day for ten years." D'Amato focuses on the victims. An American of Romanian origin, had tried for decades to track down her father's fortune. Her testimony is central.

D'Amato "I do not understand", says our American victim, who faults the Swiss banks and demands, in the name of the victims, one million dollars ... The British press lashes out as well based on a report issued by the Foreign Office. The $250 Million reimbursed by the Swiss at the end of 1946 under the terms of the Washington Agreement are only a drop in the bucket in comparison to the total amount due... According to the Labor Party member, the gold came not only from pillaged banks, but also from the Nazi concentration camps. On October 19, 1996, Berne publishes documents which attest to this fact. Money lying dormant in Switzerland was used in Poland after the war. Other indications, other documents. The Swiss turned away 30,000 Jewish refugees from Switzerland during the war, three times as many as had been assumed up until that point.

After the customary deliberations, the Confederation and the banks enact legislative acts. An investigative commission, the Volcker Commission, is created jointly by the banks and the World Jewish Congress. In November, the Federal Council [the Cabinet] names a Task Force. And then a historical commission, headed by Jean-Francois Bergier. Blackmail, ransom, campaign of destabilization against the Swiss financial position. Jean-Pascal Delamuraz pours out his heart during a bilingual interview during the year of his presidency. Jewish groups react with anger. Avraham Burg threatens the banks with a boycott and supports the Federal Council to review the declarations of Jean-Pascal Delamuraz: "It would be almost impossible for us to sit together around the same table with people who did not deny and did not reject and did not oppose the President calling me a blackmailer."

Jean-Pascal Delamuraz renews the dialogue two weeks later by officially expressing his apology. "I apologize for having hurt your feelings and those of many others, in particular those within the Jewish community. I guarantee you that this was not my intention."

January 5th - Carlo Jagmetti, the Swiss Ambassador to Washington, is forced to resign. He used the term "war" in a confidential report published by the Swiss press. The banks create a special fund for victims of the Holocaust. Insurance companies and industry also increase their compensation. On March 5, the Federal Council proposes the creation of a Solidarity Foundation. The goal of this foundation is to give reparations to those who suffered in Switzerland and abroad. It will be financed by reevaluation of part of the gold reserve of the National bank.

The publication of the Eisenstat report brings new accusations, this time official: Switzerland had particularly close relations with the Nazi regime. After the war, this role seems incomprehensible to Americans. The press and d'Amato continue unabated.

So here we have all these questions, revelations in our press, articles, radio and television programs following these interventions from abroad, and all this provoked a mass of letters which we received while preparing this program. Part of those who are with us this evening, expressed a desire to speak on these issues. What you are going to hear now in eight to ten testimonies in the first part of the program represents a sampling of the reactions we received, both in written and oral form while preparing this show.

Now Mr. [Gunsweiler], could you describe your reaction to all this for us.

M.G.: I have the feeling that all in all, governments and all countries of the world, at one time or another the truth is either masked or hidden. On the other hand, we can say that according to the press many documents exist or have been known about for a long time, and I would like to know why no one has done anything up until now in Switzerland to try and get to the bottom of these criticisms and come up with figures on the past.

There are many well-known figures present, an official historian, former Federal Councilman Mr. George Andre Chevallaz. and, Mr. Ziegler, an official agitator. Neither one has reacted. Mr. Ziegler has in any of his books spoken about the Jewish funds and after the publication of his recent book, was done under pressure of the United States, I would like to know why Mr. Ziegler did not write his book 10 or 20 years ago.

There is a second reaction, since I have just read the Eisenstat report. According to this one, we were at war --with the United States against our country, and I ask all those Swiss who are listening to me, to address the question of how we managed to avoid the dictatorship of a country with 280,000,000 people over a small country of seven million. It's a shame, a real shame...

The government of a country has a different task. It must save the essential, making sure that the country survives. This does not occur without compromise in the best sense of the term. The crux of the matter is to determine whether or not this compromise is acceptable.

In the case of Switzerland, the authorities admirably succeeded to hold their own in the midst of a Europe in flames, a country 40,000 kilometers with 5 million men and women sheltered from the war without counting the number of refugees, prisoners, etc.

I see two main questions which should be addressed: The first is relatively simple: could we have done better? Have made less concessions to obtain the same results? The other question, much more serious, is the following: "should certain concessions have been refused and, as a result, should we have confronted the worst, estrangement from the neighboring devil, and very likely war, occupation, with the country destroyed, industry in ruins or with the populace working for Germany and the youth sent by force elsewhere. This dramatic alternative should, in my mind, always be thought of as a real possibility when discussing this issue.

For example, in the so-called "three circle policy" which in effect meant that there were "good" refugees, less good, and those who would never be allowed to come to Switzerland, but 75% of the people voted in favor of these measures which permitted children who were fifteen years old and had committed no crimes to be thrown in prison. The boat which is, therefore, always full, continued to refuse refugees who desperately needed aid.

We had, therefore, to come to terms with our adversaries. And I imagine that it is rather par for the course that concessions had to be made. But, as someone just pointed out, would it have been better to just surrender and be surrounded and be unable to help any refugees at all?

As far as the story with the banks, we were not aware of this, we had heard nothing about this at all, only that before the end of the war and immediately following the war, rumors circulated that our banks contributed as much as the army to guarantee our neutrality. But we were happy to see the army, and our soldiers were convinced that they were protecting us; we grabbed onto this, for there was not much to grab onto at that time.

...it was a very precarious period, from the military point of view, this enabled the Swiss economy to cooperate, to collaborate with Germany. This was a necessary precondition ... it is not a question of denigrating the army but of developing a realistic approach: it was an example of Swiss realism to say: "We are withdrawing"; this was security for the army, for the soldiers, but there still was the population to consider, in the centers, who were no longer protected. The General said as much in January: "We should not withdraw, this would be a false strategy. We must defend the frontier and if we withdraw at this time, then it is for economic reasons. It is this point which I find very important: this combination of military dissuasion which existed then, but which permitted economic collaboration with the Germans; and being useful is also a means of gaining security.

Masculine voice: Do the Swiss banks owe their prosperity to the war? What was their role in the recycling of stolen gold and jewelry? Did the Banque Nationale Suisse know from where the German gold came? Did the Government Council support its policy? Did the National Bank, preoccupied with the health of the Swiss franc and the struggle against inflation, did it ignore moral and political questions?

Can we say that Switzerland's purchase of German gold reinforced Hitler's Germany to the point of prolonging the war?

So the real question is whether today we should feel the weight of responsibility for decisions made without our knowledge. To show you how we knew nothing, I have a small object I would like to show you: this may relate to the third subject: it is a rocket flare which fell near the Sambrancher [?] factory. You will not find this mentioned in the newspapers; but it is a sign from the Americans who, one night, surrounded all the factories in the region to show that there was no need to produce electricity which was used for aluminum...

The problem is this: it's very easy to say "the Americans should tend to their own fields," it's very easy to say "the Jews want our money," as in today's poll, but our problem is finally, --and what we need to ask our historians--is "Sirs, why this veil of secrecy? Who knew what? And why were we not told before?"

We still do not know, some specialists say. That defining roaming funds or Nazi accounts is an accounting matter and quickly determined. Others say "Not at all, the records research work is enormous. We'll never know the truth." How can you research accurately?

I would like to add that historians--and I have been one for ten years--are desperately trying to enter these banks and continue their research,in order to better pinpoint Switzerland's financial role and its relations with Nazi Germany. But until now it has been a resounding Nyet from the banks.

Mr. Z: He embodies the institution! He embodies the institution! Stolen gold! In other word the ones responsible. Not the people--the people knew nothing. I completely agree with what was said: knew nothing. My father was on the border, until the last day of his life he knew nothing.

Mr. Z: By way of Switzerland

Mr. R: Mr. Ziegler, you also said in your book, and this is true, that each ingot is identified. They knew exactly what they were receiving. Furthermore, and this is important, let's not forget what happened in the US. The United States took an extremely serious step in 1941: they blocked Swiss assets. At that moment, it was impossible for Switzerland to guarantee its reserve, its cash if you will, other than by transacting business with Germany. I believe these two items must be stated now.

Mr. R: Sir

Mr. G.: The Swiss Franc's stability everyone wanted Swiss Francs and its stability was never in question. There was no difficulty in paying imports. At any rate, relations between Germany and Switzerland were based on exchanges. Switzerland granted an enormous credit line to Germany, and there was no problem there. The Swiss gold reserves were sufficiently large before the war to accommodate payments for imports of raw materials from countries other than Germany. I see absolutely no reason why

Mr. Roth, allow me to say this. In our country, Mr. Williger, the President of the Confederation in 1995, had the courage to ask for forgiveness for policies that killed Jewish refugees. Why do you, the Banque Nationale, today, with all these revelations, do you not have the decency, the courage You are a good man, but I mean -- why doesn't your president have Mr. Williger courage and say: "Yes, 50 years ago, a crime was committed, not by Switzerland, but by a Swiss institution." Make the gesture, you will be doing the Swiss people an enormous favor,

Clearly within the latitude granted by the right to neutrality, the Banque Nationale had to act. Ultimately, what was its main concern? And we forget this too often. It was not managing the Franc to ensure a growing economy. It was managing the Franc to dissuade Germany. That is, the Franc remains an international currency, but can only do so, precisely, it is in good health, stable, inconvertible, etc. There you have it.

Neutrality is a factor in all wars. It was a factor in the First World War and one in the Second. Germany knew before the war what raw resources were available. The Allies knew it. Neutralizing those who are neutral, if I can say this, is part of economic warfare. I think that this context too is necessary when discussing this matter, rather than accusing an institution. Once the moral question is asked, and it must be asked in the strongest terms. But the context of a war is important as well. And this is larger than just how an institution behaved.

I say that there is no reason why the Confederation or the Swiss people should pay for the banks in terms of prestige or reputation. This is a matter for the banks, your bank specifically, who committed some serious violations. The Swiss population should not have to suffer the consequences. And Mr. Cotti should not try to fix things, this is your responsibility[other voices] You cashed in the millions.

Mr. R: I simply would like to remind Mr. Ziegler that the American documents did not reveal anything new regarding the Banque Nationale's operations: everything is clear since 1981.

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