In 1989, Soviet control of communist governments throughout Europe begins to weaken and the Cold War comes to a close. As the USSR's power declines, North Korea loses the security guarantees and economic support that had sustained it for 45 years.

	Satellite photo of Yongbyon

In response, U.S. pursues a strategy in which North Korea's full compliance with the NPT would lead to progress on other diplomatic issues, such as the normalization of relations.

	Hans Blix at Yongbyon facility

The inspections do not go well. Over the next several months, the North Koreans repeatedly block inspectors from visiting two of Yongbyon's suspected nuclear waste sites and IAEA inspectors find evidence that the country is not revealing the full extent of its plutonium production.

North Korea's announcement shocks the world. Facing heavy domestic pressure from Republicans who oppose negotiations with North Korea, President Bill Clinton appoints Robert Gallucci to start a new round of negotiations. After 89 days, North Korea announces it has suspended its withdrawal. (The NPT requires a 90-day notice before a country can withdraw.)

In December, IEAE Director-General Blix announces that the agency can no longer provide "any meaningful assurances" that North Korea is not producing nuclear weapons.

North Korea announces that it is going to move its stock of irradiated fuel from its five-megawatt reactor without allowing international inspectors to monitor the process. It also threatens to go one step further and reprocess the fuel from that reactor, which would give Pyongyang enough plutonium to make five or six nuclear weapons.

The Clinton administration decides that it will take every possible action to try and stop the North Korean nuclear weapons program. It considers a strike against the Yongbyon facility, but concludes that the consequences -- an estimated 100,000 casualties from a North Korean reprisal are too severe.

The administration instead decides to press for U.N. sanctions, a move that North Korea considers extremely provocative. Park Yong Su, a North Korean negotiator, warns, "If you force us to go to war, we will go at anytime." He threatens that North Korea will turn Seoul into "a sea of flames."

In South Korea, authorities call for civil defense exercises to prepare the country for an attack. Clinton asks the Pentagon for options to reinforce troop strength in South Korea.

In October, the U.S. and North Korea complete negotiations in Geneva of what becomes known as the Agreed Framework. North Korea agrees to shut down the Yongbyon complex and cease plutonium production. In return, the U.S. promises to help with the construction of two modern light-water reactors to help solve North Korea's energy problems. The light-water reactors are modern nuclear power plants that are built, operated, and regulated in accordance with international standards of safety. The U.S. also agrees to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until construction on the light-water reactors is complete.

When the deal is announced, many Congressional Republicans are outraged. Critics claim that the deal is "appeasement" because it rewards North Korea for bad behavior. In part because of Congressional opposition, construction of the light-water reactors falls behind schedule and delivery of the heavy fuel oil is often late.

> Read experts' analyses of the Agreed Framework.

One U.S. soldier is killed when North Korean forces shoot down a U.S. helicopter. North Korea accuses the helicopter pilot of spying, while the U.S. maintains that the aircraft had strayed off course during a routine training mission. Pyongyang holds the pilot for 13 days and to win his release, the U.S. expresses "sincere regret" for the incident.

	Kim Dae Jung

> Read an interview with Lim Dong Won, the architect of the "Sunshine Policy."

After several months of negotiations, North Korea agrees to allow U.S. inspectors visit a suspected nuclear site located at Kumchangri in exchange for food aid. Inspectors twice visit the complex -- which was believed to house an underground nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing operation inside of a mountain -- but find no evidence of nuclear activity at the site, although some continue to speculate that the North Koreans removed evidence before allowing inspections. The incident is an embarrassment to U.S. officials.

The first U.S. presidential envoy to visit North Korea, Perry tries to convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missile development programs in exchange for improved diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S. His trip, during which he hand-carries and delivers a letter from President Clinton to Kim Jong Il, is the culmination of his policy review.

Perry delivers his final report in October, at the end of an eight-month review. The report concludes that "the urgent focus of U.S. policy toward the DPRK must be to end its nuclear weapons and long-range missile-related activities."

The Perry report suggests a two-path strategy in which the U.S. and North Korea would gradually negotiate an end to North Korea's weapons program and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

North Korea pledges to freeze all tests of its long-range missiles and President Clinton responds by easing some economic sanctions that were put in place in 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.

	Kim Jong Il

In August, family reunions are held in Seoul and Pyongyang for families divided at the end of the Korean War. The following month, athletes from both North and South Korea march together in the opening ceremony of the Olympic games in Sydney, Australia.

In October, Kim Dae Jung receives the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to open a dialogue with North Korea.

Angry at the loss of electricity from delays in the construction of the light-water reactors promised in the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang threatens to restart its nuclear program.

A high-level envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visits Washington in early October. He brings an invitation for President Clinton to travel for a summit in Pyongyang and reaffirms that North Korea wants to improve relations with the U.S.

Jo's visit results in the issuance of a joint communiqué in which the two countries state their intentions to "fundamentally improve" bilateral relations. The communiqué also notes that, "As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity."

	Madeleine Albright and Kim Jong Il toast

Another reason behind Albright's mission is to lay the groundwork for a potential visit to Pyongyang by President Clinton. At the end of the summit, Kim Jong Il reiterates an invitation for Clinton to visit North Korea. However, Clinton, who's at the end of his presidency and is consumed by the Middle East peace process, decides not to go.

At first, it appears that the Bush administration will continue the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with North Korea. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters, "We do plan to engage with North Korea and pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off. Some promising elements were left on the table."

	Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush

The administration also announces that it will conduct a review of U.S. policy towards North Korea. In remarks to reporters, President Bush voices doubt over trusting North Korea, saying, "Part of the problem in dealing with North Korea, there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

North Korea warns that it will consider restarting missile tests if the Bush administration refuses to resume diplomatic contacts aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. The following month, the State Department reports that North Korea has conducted tests of its long-range Taepodong missile.

After completing its policy review, the Bush administration agrees to talk to North Korea, but insists upon a broad agenda: that talks go beyond Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs to also include a reducation of conventional forces, and that North Korea immediately restarts cooperation with the IAEA.

The Sept. 11 attacks raise new fears in the U.S. about weapons proliferations and the possibility that a rogue nation would sell its missiles and nuclear technology to a terrorist group.

	George W. Bush giving "axis of evil" speech

North Korea's official state newspaper reacts by accusing the U.S. of trying to occupy North Korea. It declares the speech is "little short of declaring war."

In the summer of 2002, the CIA, working with evidence that it had been collecting since the middle of Clinton's second term, concludes that North Korea is secretly pursuing a uranium enrichment program. The uranium enrichment program is different from the plutonium-based program that Pyongyang agreed to freeze during negotiations for the 1994 Agreed Framework; however the U.S. argues that North Korea has violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement.

On Oct. 3, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly travels to Pyongyang to confront the North Koreans with the evidence. The next day, the North Koreans admit to the program but refuse to end it. Pyongyang's admission is not publicly revealed for two weeks.

In November, the U.S. Japan, and South Korea cut off all fuel oil shipments to North Korea.

	Monitoring equipment in Yongbyon

As fears that North Korea may soon begin producing nuclear weapons escalate, the Bush administration maintains that the current problems can be resolved peacefully only through a multilateral diplomatic process involving Japan, South Korea and China.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a Northeast Asia specialist, says, "Our suggestion is not quite that we handle these talks multilaterally, but we have a multilateral umbrella, of any sort." His remarks reportedly infuriate President Bush, who orders a ban on any public discussion of anything that might resemble one-on-one or bilateral talks with North Korea.

After restarting its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in late February, Pyongyang tests two short-range missiles in March. It also intercepts and harasses a U.S. spy plane flying off its coast and announces that it is pulling out of the armistice talks that have been going on since the end of the Korean War.