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(He was interviewed in April 1995)
Q: From your experience as the last U.S. Ambassador to Burma, do you believe that giving aid to the military government could stop the narcotics coming out of Burma?
LEVIN: No, not at all because we had a program throughout our involvement in the anti-narcotics effort in Burma, the... size of the opium crop just steadily increased so the fact that we were trying to do something about it was not producing any results at all.
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Q: What sort of aid did the U.S. give before that didn't work?
LEVIN: Primarily, we provided aircraft, spray aircraft, the chemicals were spraying, we provided helicopters, we provided radios, we provided the type of infrastructural needs to carry out a programme of eradication through spraying.
Q: And why now give anti-narcotics aid?
LEVIN: It's a great frustration. The problem is real, the problem is growing, there are huge crops of opium in the Burma area and there is this American sense if there's a problem out there, you've got to do something about it and the continued belief that well, it's better than doing nothing.
Q: Would it be better than doing nothing to attack a particular group? For instance, there is great pressure now to attack Khun Sa.
LEVIN: That's a dream. I mean we're going to get rid of the problem of narcotics in the Caribbean by putting Noriega under arrest, capturing him, because he was such a major figure in this Columbia, smuggling cocaine. I mean, it's just a dream. You get at one man, you get one organisation, another one will spring up.
Q: But if it's a dream, what would really be needed to actually do something to reduce the narcotics?
LEVIN: What is needed is a process. We saw that in the case of Thailand. Thailand used to be a major producer of opium. Now they produce almost no opium and the reason for that is not any eradication programmes, the reason for that is you have major economic developments in Thailand, it's tied the country together, you have roads, you have infrastructure, you have the arm of the government brought into what formerly were remote areas, you have better economic prospects for the people living in those areas. It's a transformation of the economy of backwood regions which, in the case of Thailand, brought about almost the end of opium growing and that is basically how this problem will be dealt with.
Q: So in a sense you've got to solve the political problems first before you deal with that problem.
LEVIN: You've got to get a government there that appreciates the importance of treating its minorities like human beings, of extending educational, medical facilities as well as enforcement power of the state, knitting that area together with roads. And it is a very long process, and it is way off in the future. In my view, that opium will be growing there for decades to come.
Q: [W]hen the State Department sends people abroad, they are thoroughly briefed of the politics of the country....Would it help if the DA started [as well]...
LEVIN: Well yes, but again, I don't want to treat the DA just like a police force just totally without any sensitivities. I've met some DA people whom I have a very high regard for who were culturally sensitive, who understood the issues involved....So it's not a question of cultural sensitivity. There's some of that there. It's a question of going into an organisation with this mission of doing something about a problem and even if it's just marginal, even if it's basically not even of any consequence, there still is the satisfaction; we're trying to do something about it, we've got a few kilos here and we've wiped out a few acres there and you can understand the psychic satisfaction, but to think that that is really going to deal with the issue is just...unrealistic.
Q: So was that the underlying reason for the conflict that broke out between the State Department and the DEA?
LEVIN: There always is a tension when you're dealing with a political problem of Government that was repugnant, the sense on the part of the State Department, certainly right after this massacre of students, that "Do we really want to supply this government with materials that strengthen its enforcement arm?" And the answer was no, but on the other hand, the DEA the sense of-- we still have this mission, we still have this problem and we should put the politics aside in trying to deal with the problem.-- There's the tension there.
Q: Why was the head of the DEA in your time...sent home from Rangoon?
LEVIN: Because he wasn't ..responsive to my direction. He was running off in directions that I did not approve of.
Q: Do you believe that the CIA has helped those divisions in the form of money, arms and political support-- played a part in building up the [opium] trade in Burma?
LEVIN: Not in any conscious way. I don't think the CIA in those days anyone paid too much attention to what others were doing in a part time...subsidiary occupation and at that time the major..emphasis, the whole thrust was [that] these elements could be useful as a means of keeping pressure on the PRC and annoying the PRC....[The] old policy at that time was one of... containment. We saw this aggressive China. [I]t was a misreading of the whole situation; but the whole effort was to keep pressure on China particularly at a time when we were involved in the Korean war. So, I think whatever was in terms of the opium, people just weren't focusing on that at all.
Q: Can you discuss the allegations that the Burmese staged the burning of the fake heroin refinery?
LEVIN: ....I'm not familiar with, the Burmese raid on the refinery but to think a refinery amounts to anything it's a few shacks and a couple of large pots and pans. To destroy a refinery is nothing. The thing is to capture the refiner and that would be much more impressive than destroying a structures which are just primitive and which are of almost no consequence.
Q: Would you be able to say to what extent Khun Sa is simply the drug trafficker and what extent he's a truly national leader....?
LEVIN: My impression and it's only an impression is that he is more of a drug trafficker than a Shan nationalist. It just impresses me that this man's activity is largely involved in drugs... but again,... I just don't have any inside information. I think that is a judgmental question and nobody really has a very tough answer to....
Q: ...[S]o how much drug-related corruption were you aware of within the Burmese government while you were there?
LEVIN: My sense of it was that it wasn't that high level of Burmese government involvement in narcotics...[T]he military, they lived rather simply, they lived well by Burmese standards but there were certainly no obscene displays of wealth and one didn't get the sense that this was a ..leadership with bank accounts abroad and driving around in Rolls Royces. It was very simple living on a plane much higher than the average Burmese of course. In Burmese terms, they were living very luxurious lives but in terms of what we think about corrupt governments cumulating wealth, there was no evidence of that.
Q: [D]o you accept the DEA's contention that the Burmese Government is genuinely interested in vigorous drug enforcement?
LEVIN: The Burmese Government is generally interested in rubbing out Khun Sa because he represents a challenge to their political authority. The Burmese Government is probably disinterested in going into some of the Kokang areas where they've reached accommodations with local leaders and these groups represent no political challenge to the Burmese Government. I don't mean... that Khun Sa is a threat to take over Burma but he is just trying to remain free of Burmese political control. The other groups have more or less subjected themselves to Burmese political control, they'll be obeisant. They will they consider themselves as no longer challenging the political authority of the Burmese government and therefore the Burmese government I think has very little interest in acting against these groups which also have a major part in producing narcotics.
Q: If Washington asked you advice now on whether to give anti-drug aid to Burma, what would you say in the light of what you've just said before?
LEVIN: I'd say that you're spinning your wheels and you're wasting your resources. You're better off putting these resources into treatment of addicts back in the United States.
Q: If the majority of the opium is actually grown in the areas of Kokang and accommodations with the Burmese government, what is the point of then trying to launch a major campaign against Khun Sa? What's the point in the DEA promoting that?
LEVIN: Well, the point is Khun Sa is importantly involved and anything you can do about the problem helps, that's the attitude. It's half a loaf... [A] quarter of a loaf is better than no loaf at all but again, to think we are engaging in this personality thing in dealing with a huge problem. If we get Noriega, Noriega is going to help....If we get these personalities, somehow it's going to ease the problem. So we get Khun Sa. I tell you, there's going to be five guys leaping in to replace him in one way or another.
Q: Since then, while you've been here, have people been interested in Burma or do you find that generally they're not interested?
LEVIN: There's not a keen interest in Burma. There's awakening interest on the part of some of the Chinese businessmen here who see a chance of maybe making a buck out of Burma, so there is some.
Q: I suppose there could be quite a lot of [interest in] Burma, it's probably one of the areas of the biggest expansion.
LEVIN: Well, the economic potential is there, a lot of resources [are] there. [I]t's not over-populated, you have the population and surprisingly still sophisticated despite this horrendous Government of the last thirty odd years and there is a tremendous potential there. The deficiency is an enlightened government. I mean the government have almost no understanding of economic principles, they have a strong bias against businessmen, they see businessmen as really just exploiting the resources and ripping off money for their own use. They regard themselves, the army regards themselves as really the only pure, untainted patriots in all Burma. They have a macho attitude, it is almost the attitude of a teenage rugby team, you know, "We're the greatest, we're tough, we don't give a damn about anybody else." [A]nd they look at the intellectuals as effete, they look at businessmen as corrupt and there is this sense of we know what we're doing.
And you add to this some of the traditional Burmese attitudes of the ruling class that the people really exist to serve the needs of the rulers with no reciprocal obligation on the part of the rulers toward the people. And you put that all in a mix and you get a government now whose primary success today has been doubling the size of the Burmese Army, getting in a huge amount of equipment purchased from China continuing to neglect the education and medical needs of the people. Transform...Rangoon University from one of the great universities of Asia into probably one of the worst universities in Asia and a country which has no cultural intellectual life. There's no literature being produced, there's no expansion or creativity within the native culture as such, it is a country that is hoped for in the future but right now it is a dismal leadership producing a country that is not marked by any great accomplishment.
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