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Insiders involved in the Bonn Conference describe the challenges of bringing
together the various hostile Afghan factions, the forging of behind-the-scenes
compromises, and the persistent fear that the conference might break up without
a final agreement. | | |
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U.S. National Security Adviser
Early on, we had understood -- and not just the United States, but with our
partners -- that the United Nations was going to have to play a major role in
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. We were somewhat concerned that the U.N.
might not move quickly enough to fill the vacuum, if you will, between the
Taliban and the new government. ...
I think what is very interesting about this is that the U.N. did respond very
quickly. In fact, the Bonn Conference was put together rather rapidly, and an
interim authority put together far more rapidly than I think any of us thought
possible. So in some ways, they turned out to be unfounded fears. But it was
just that there was a bit of a shock at how quickly the Taliban was routed, and
the fact that we were now facing a reconstruction more quickly than we had
expected.
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U.N. Special Representative to Afghanistan
Our aim was really very modest. From my visit to Iran and Pakistan what I have
seen is that there were a number of groups that were talking about peace. Plus,
the Northern Alliance, which now had 70 percent of the land. The Taliban had
gone and were not a possible partner. So the idea we had is, let us, as a first
step ... get these processes welded into one, and do away with these
far-reached processes. So hence the Pashtun group, which had just been started
with support from Pakistan, the Cyprus group, which was a small group of
intellectuals from inside and outside -- inside meaning Iran and Pakistan
mainly -- and also from the [Rome] group around the king, plus the Northern
Alliance. That is when the idea started to take shape. But these are the people
who are going to get together. It's not the perfect arrangement, but we looked
all over the place, but on what criteria are you going to invite people, now
that the Taliban have gone?
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U.S. Undersecretary of State for Policy Planning
What we needed was a political neutral site. We needed a place that could be
secured, because obviously we were worried about terrorism. We needed a place
everybody could get to. We needed a place that didn't have political baggage.
It turned out, for example, one of the sites in the Persian Gulf was
unacceptable, because that had been one of the three countries that along the
way had recognized the Taliban. So by the time you dealt with geography,
history, security and the rest, you started running out of sites. It turned out
that Bonn was a pretty good compromise.
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U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan
... The Afghans arrived, four different delegations of considerably different
weight and size. The Northern Alliance delegation was the most representative
in a sense: it had Pashtuns, it had people from all over the country, and it
had real weight in the sense that it actually was in Afghanistan and governing
at that point about half of the country. The other delegations represented,
they were called the Rome group, the Cyprus group and the Peshawar group.
The Rome group was the king and his advisers and people who had been associated
with him. The Peshawar group was largely people representing the large number
of exiles and refugees in Pakistan. The Cyprus group was a group that had been
meeting of expatriates that had been meeting to try and find a peace
settlement. They had some connections with Iran, although they were no means
simply mouthpieces for the Iranians. But the Iranians had been supporting that
form and a number of people in it had positive relations with Iran.
[A] point of comparison was sort of the Dayton Peace conference. I found
that the Afghans -- and I've found this since -- I mean it's not as conflicted
a society as societies in the Balkans that I dealt with where if you ask the
average Balkan to explain what his grievances are he'll go back a thousand
years. Afghans they go back maybe a decade or at most two and then they [have
this] sort of golden age where everybody got along with each other really under
the king and in the governments that preceded the Soviet invasion. And so you
know the history of ethnic and internecine strife is shorter at least in terms
of the popular memory.
So the delegations were very civil to each other. A number of them were related
to each other, a number of them had been friends before they were enemies, and
it wasn't difficult at all to get them to sit down and talk to each other. I
mean you didn't have to spend days of negotiating as to the size of the table
or how many people sat there or who could speak first. These things were
arranged much more easily than they are in similar situations. I mean I also
did the Vietnam peace talks back in the 1960s and I can remember spending an
entire year negotiating over the shape of the table before they could actually
sit down and talk to each other. There was very little of that.
Having said that at the beginning of the conference, when you talked to
Brahimi about what you hoped this conference would achieve, on that first day
were you looking at trying to build a framework for more talks? Or did you have
in your mind that you just might possibly come out with an end to this?
... The United States had certainly come to the conclusion that this was an
essential and maybe irreplaceable opportunity; that if this meeting broke up
without a conclusion it was going to be very difficult to get another meeting,
and that therefore it had to come to what I guess you would call a self
implementing conclusion -- that is simply getting halfway and then agreeing to
meet again would not be adequate, that this meeting had to agree on an outcome
which wouldn't require this group to get together again. ...
The core question that we felt had to be settled on this occasion was: Who was
going to on an interim basis govern Afghanistan and become a partner for the
international community in Afghanistan's reconstruction?
Brahimi certainly shared the view that this was an opportunity that shouldn't
be missed and that we shouldn't allow people to disperse until this had been
achieved. I think some of the delegations that came from other countries felt
that this was unrealistic, that it was too much, that a more modest objective
should be set. But over time we were able to persuade them otherwise.
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U.N. Special Representative to Afghanistan
One of the things that I did very early on, after the opening of the
conference, I said, "We're not going to have any formal meetings. And whenever
any one of you needs to talk to somebody else privately, you know, we will stop
these meetings." So for probably the first week, we had very, very, few
formal meetings. We were encouraging people to get together to talk to one
another, and to talk to us, privately, you know, separately, together, always
informal. And we were listening.
And also we had all the other players, you know, the Americans, the Iranians,
the British, the Pakistanis, they were all there. They were also talking to
everybody and by the way they were very angry with me at the beginning because
we didn't allow them in. And the reason was because a lot of people sitting in
the room owed a lot to these neighbors and friends, and they wouldn't you know
speak frankly in front of them, because they were probably telling them things
they don't believe. So, we didn't allow them anywhere near our meeting, they
continued to meet private.
There were also a lot of other diplomats,
including somebody from Moldova. There were something like 25, 26 countries represented
there. And somebody told me you see, "These diplomats are sitting here and why
don't you brief them?" So, I want to brief them, and I said, "Look, I'm
starting to be optimistic. Maybe we will get somewhere. But, you see, this is a
very fragile process. Any grain of sand can stop our machine."
When we left there, one of the diplomats was there, came to see me, he said,
"You said the grain of sand can stop the machine." I said, "Yes I did." "So
what grain of sand?" I told him, "Look, this is Afghanistan. There is a
sandstorm. There's a lot of sand flying around. I don't know which one is going
to fall in the machine. I'm just praying that none of this sand will get into
our machine." ...
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U.S. Undersecretary of State for Policy Planning
What was your problem with [Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin] Rabbani?
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... He was clearly a controversial figure. At this point, if our goal was to
forge a broad-based Afghan alternative, Mr. Rabbani was somewhat of a problem,
given that by appearing to be "the president," quote, unquote, that it was not
exactly a level playing field. It would be potentially an obstacle to forging
the kind of Afghan unity that we wanted.
If, at some time in the future, through an electoral process Mr. Rabbani
emerges as the leader of the Afghanis, so be it. But from our point of view, it
probably wasn't going to work if he tried to take his position as head of the
Northern Alliance or president of the Northern Alliance and translate that as
something like the president of some sort of interim political arrangement for
Afghanistan. ...
I know there was the view that we were somehow trying to keep the Northern
Alliance at arm's length. It is not true. On the other hand, we also understood
that one could not equate Afghan opposition to Northern Alliance. All along, we
were very careful about appearing to play favorites. ...
So what motivated all of this -- perhaps we were too sensitive to it -- was the
sense that we had to be careful as Americans not to appear as though we were
somehow stage-managing the Afghan opposition, that we were picking the
favorites or that we were favoring one faction against another.
So what we tried to do, perhaps uncharacteristically, was really stand back and
let the Afghans themselves come to understandings. Let them figure out what the
distribution of power would be. Not only therefore would it not look as though
we had stage-managed it, but if they themselves bought into it, by definition
that was going to be a more stable situation that one we or anyone else had
forced them to accept.
So what may have looked like standoffishness to some was simply a calculated
decision on our part not to get overly involved in an intrusive way that many
of us feared would be counterproductive.
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U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan
I think there were sort of three turning points in the meeting in Bonn. The
first was came after several days, where it was becoming apparent that they
were simply trying to do too much; that they were trying to agree on the
composition of an interim administration. They were trying to agree on the
composition and powers of a supreme council, which would be a quasi-legislative
body. They were trying to agree on the role for the ex-king and whether he
would have some sort of interim head of state type function. They were trying
to agree on issues of disarmament and peacekeeping and that time was going by,
that this probably was more than could be agreed.
I proposed therefore to initially in a series of discussions with the
individual factions, that this should be a process of simplification; that the
supreme legislative council should be put to the side and left for future work.
It wasn't essential to the outcome. The role of the king should be defined as
opening the loya jirga, the constituent assembly that would meet six months
after the interim assembly came soon to power, and that his role didn't need to
be defined beyond that for the purposes of this meeting. The central agreement
which had to be forged was the membership and the internal administration. And
Brahimi then after working this issue in the corridors and separately brought
them together and there was an agreement to proceed on that basis.
The second crisis was when after several days during which Brahimi had tried to
get each delegation to nominate its candidates for membership in the interim
administration, the head of the Northern Alliance delegation, Interior Minister
Qanooni said that he was unable to get instructions to do so and that he felt
that the best solution might be to take an adjournment for 10 days or so, to
allow him to go back to Kabul and get further instructions and then return.
I said that I didn't think that was optimal, but I understood his dilemma and
that I would think about it and get back to him. I then called the Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage, and explained the situation to him. I said that a
good deal had been achieved, that there'd been agreement to call for a
peacekeeping force and in Kabul which represented a significant advance on the
Northern Alliance's position on that point, that much else of the final
document had been agreed, and that therefore the meeting could be represented
as progress, as a positive step. But that it was going to be difficult to
reassemble the group and there might be prolonged new negotiations about when,
where, how many. He said that he'd speak to the secretary and get back to me.
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U.S. Secretary of State
The answer was "Do not let them break up. Keep them there. Lock them up if you
have to. We do not want this to go anywhere else. We're almost there, and this
is the time to grind it out on this line. If they go off, I don't know when
I'll get them all back together." Rich Armitage loves the little idea that once
you get frogs in a wheelbarrow, you don't let them get out. That was a good
analogy. So we kept them in. ...
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U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan
There was a spate of sort of bilateral diplomacy all focused on persuading
Professor Rabbani and the others in Kabul who still had reservations to
withdraw those reservations and let the process go forward. And that
succeeded. Later that day I went back to see Qanooni and said that we'd
considered his proposal and on reflection had decided that it made more sense
to keep people there and to try and get an outcome. And he sort of smiled and
he said, "Did it really take you four hours to reach that conclusion? I reached
it about a half an hour after we spoke."
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U.S. National Security Adviser
I think we were all really pretty amazed and quite respectful of what the
Afghans were able to do at Bonn. Yes, they had a lot of help. But what was
really impressive was the degree to which the Afghans themselves were
determined to use this new opportunity to make a new start for Afghanistan.
Very often, we get caught up in the history, and we say, "Afghanistan has
always had trouble being stable, it's had trouble having a central government,"
and we forget that, if you give people a choice between freedom and tyranny,
they'll very often choose freedom. So the Afghans themselves comported
themselves very well at Bonn, and that was very gratifying.
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