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At their peak, the U.S. forces involved in the war effort numbered no more than
60,000 (about half of which were in the Persian Gulf), and Western allies added
no more than 15,000. But the U.S.-led military campaign has hardly been small
in scale. By the end of January, the United States had flown about 25,000
sorties in the air campaign and dropped 18,000 bombs, including 10,000
precision munitions. The number of U.S. sorties exceeded the number of U.S.
sorties flown in the 1999 Kosovo war, and the United States dropped more smart
bombs on Afghanistan than NATO dropped on Serbia in 1999. In fact, the total
number of precision munitions expended in Afghanistan amounted to more than
half the number used in Operation Desert Storm. (In addition, more than 3,000
U.S. and French bombs were dropped on surviving enemy forces in March during
Operation Anaconda, in which some 1,500 Western forces and 2,000 Afghans
launched a major offensive against about 1,000 enemy troops in the mountainous
region of eastern Afghanistan.)
If the U.S. strategy has had many virtues, however, it has also had flaws.
Most important, it has apparently failed to achieve a key war goal: capturing
or killing Osama bin Laden and other top enemy leaders. Such hunts are
inherently difficult, but the prospects for success in this case were reduced
considerably by U.S. reliance on Pakistani forces and Afghan militias for
sealing off enemy escape routes and conducting cave-to-cave searches during
critical periods. If most al Qaeda leaders stay at large, the United States
and other countries will remain more vulnerable to terrorism than they would be
otherwise -- perhaps significantly so.
But on balance, Operation Enduring Freedom has been very impressive. It may
wind up being more notable in the annals of American military history than
anything since Douglas MacArthur's invasion at Inchon in Korea half a century
ago. Even Norman Schwarzkopf's famous "left hook" around Iraqi forces in
Operation Desert Storm was less bold; had it been detected, U.S. airpower still
could have protected coalition flanks, and American forces could have outrun
Iraqi troops toward most objectives on the ground. By contrast, Operation
Enduring Freedom's impressive outcome was far from preordained. Too much
American force (e.g., a protracted and punishing strategic air campaign or an
outright ground invasion) risked uniting Afghan tribes and militias to fight
the outside power, angering the Arab world, destabilizing Pakistan, and
spawning more terrorists. Too little force, or the wrong kind of force, risked
outright military failure and a worsening of Afghanistan's humanitarian crisis
-- especially given the limited capabilities of the small militias that made up
the anti-Taliban coalition.
Beginning on October 7, Afghans, Americans, and coalition partners cooperated
to produce a remarkable military victory in Afghanistan. The winning elements
included 15,000 Northern Alliance fighters (primarily from the Tajik and Uzbek
ethnic groups), 100 combat sorties a day by U.S. planes, 300-500 Western
special operations forces and intelligence operatives, a few thousand Western
ground forces, and thousands of Pashtun soldiers in southern Afghanistan who
came over to the winning side in November. Together they defeated the Taliban
forces, estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 strong, as well as a few thousand al
Qaeda fighters.
Various Western countries, particularly several NATO allies and Australia,
played important roles as well. A formal NATO role in the war was neither
necessary nor desirable, given the location of the conflict and the need for a
supple and secretive military strategy. Still, NATO allies stood squarely by
America's side, invoking the alliance's Article V mutual-defense clause after
September 11, and demonstrated that commitment by sending five AWACS aircraft
to help patrol U.S. airspace. Forces from the United Kingdom, Australia,
France, and Canada appear to have frequently contributed to the effort in
Afghanistan; forces from Denmark, Norway, and Germany also participated in
Operation Anaconda in March. Allied aircraft flew a total of some 3,000
sorties on relief, reconnaissance, and other missions. As noted, France
dropped bombs during Operation Anaconda, and the United Kingdom fired several
cruise missiles on the first day of battle as well. Numerous countries,
including the Netherlands, Italy, and Japan, deployed ships to the Arabian Sea.
The cooperation continues today, as major Western allies constitute the
backbone of the UN-authorized stability force in Kabul.
The short war has had several phases. The first began on October 7 and lasted
a month; the second ran through November and saw the Taliban lose control of
the country; the third was characterized by intensive bombing of suspected al
Qaeda strongholds in the Tora Bora mountain and cave complex in December; the
fourth began with the inauguration of Hamid Karzai as interim prime minister
and continues to date.
During the first part of the war, Taliban forces lost their large physical
assets such as radar, aircraft, and command-and-control systems, but they hung
on to power in most regions. Most al Qaeda training camps and headquarters
were also destroyed. Although Taliban forces did not quickly collapse, they
were increasingly isolated in pockets near the major cities. Cut off from each
other physically, they were unable to resupply or reinforce very well and had
problems communicating effectively.
In the first week of the war, U.S. aircraft averaged only 25 combat sorties a
day, but they soon upped that total to around 100. (Some 70 Tomahawk cruise
missiles were fired in the early going; a total of about 100 had been used by
December.) The United States comparably increased the number of airlift,
refueling, and other support missions. U.S. air strikes by B-52 and B-1
bombers operating out of Diego Garcia typically involved six sorties a day;
other land-based aircraft, primarily F-15ES and AC-130 gunships from Oman, flew
about as much. Planes from the three U.S. aircraft carriers based in the
Arabian Sea provided the rest of the combat punch. Reconnaissance and
refueling flights originated from the Persian Gulf region and Diego Garcia.
Some air support and relief missions also came from, or flew over, Central
Asia, where U.S. Army soldiers from the Tenth Mountain Division helped protect
airfields.
Most air attacks occurred around Afghanistan's perimeter, because the rugged
central highlands were not a major operating area for the Taliban or al Qaeda.
By the middle of October, most fixed assets worth striking had already been
hit, so combat sorties turned to targeting Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the
field. Aircraft continued to fly at an altitude of at least 10,000 feet,
because the Pentagon was fearful of antiaircraft artillery, Soviet SA-7 and
SA-13 portable antiaircraft missiles, and some 200-300 Stinger antiaircraft
missiles presumed to be in Taliban or al Qaeda possession. But most
precision-guided weapons are equally effective regardless of their altitude of
origin, provided that good targeting information is available -- as it was in
this case, thanks to U.S. troops on the ground.
The first month of the war produced only limited results and had many defense
and strategic analysts worried about the basic course of the campaign. Some of
those critics began, rather intemperately and unrealistically, to call for a
ground invasion; others opposed an invasion but thought that a substantial
intensification of efforts would prove necessary.
In phase two, beginning in early November, that intensification occurred. But
it was due not so much to an increased number of airplanes as to an increase in
their effectiveness. By then, 80 percent of U.S. combat sorties could be
devoted to directly supporting opposition forces in the field; by late
November, the tally was 90 percent. In addition, the deployment of more
unmanned aerial vehicles and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) aircraft to the region helped the United States maintain continuous
reconnaissance of enemy forces in many places. Most important, the number of
U.S. special operations forces and CIA teams working with various opposition
elements increased greatly. In mid-October, only three special operations "A
teams," each consisting of a dozen personnel, were in Afghanistan; in
mid-November, the tally was 10; by December 8, it was 17. This change meant
the United States could increasingly call in supplies for the opposition, help
it with tactics, and designate Taliban and al Qaeda targets for U.S. air
strikes using global positioning system (GPS) technology and laser range
finders. The Marine Corps also began to provide logistical support for these
teams as the war advanced.
|
Operation | Total sorties flown | Total Bombs Delivered | Precision- guided bombs delivered |
Enduring Freedom
(Afghanistan) | 38,000 | 22,000 (est) | 12,500 (est) |
Allied Force
1999
(Kosovo) | 37,500 | 23,000 | 8,050 |
Desert Storm
1991
(Persian Gulf) | 118,700 | 265,000 | 20,450 |
NOTES: In Operation Allied Force, the United States flew 60 percent of the
sorties and delivered 80 percent of the precision-guided bombs. In Operation
Desert Storm, those contributions were 85 percent and 89 percent, respectively;
in Operation Enduring Freedom, they were 92 percent and 99 percent,
respectively.
SOURCES: Enduring Freedom (all data as of March 14, 2002): U.S. Air Force,
March 15, 2002; Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, Department of Defense news
briefing, January 25, 2002; Eric Schmitt, "After January Raid, Gen. Franks
Promises to Do Better," New York Times, February 8, 2002, p. A10;
William M. Arkin, "Old-Timers Prove Invaluable in Afghanistan Air Campaign,"
Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2002, p. A12. Allied Force: Ivo H.
Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 150, 307. Desert Storm:
U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm (Washington: GAO,
1997), p. 178; Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, "Summary Report," Gulf
War Air Power Survey (Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
1993), pp. 184-85. | |
As a result, enemy forces collapsed in northern cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif
and Taloqan over the weekend of November 9-11. Taliban fighters ran for their
lives, provoking their leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, to broadcast a demand that
his troops stop "behaving like chickens." Kabul fell soon afterward. By
November 16, Pentagon officials were estimating that the Taliban controlled
less than one-third of the country, in contrast to 85 percent just a week
before. Reports also suggested that Muhammad Atef, a key al Qaeda operative,
was killed by U.S. bombs in mid-November. Kunduz, the last northern stronghold
of enemy forces where several thousand Taliban and al Qaeda troops apparently
remained, fell on November 24-25.
In late November, more than 1,000 U.S. marines of the 15th and 26th Marine
Expeditionary Units established a base about 60 miles southwest of Kandahar,
which the Taliban continued to hold. They deployed there directly from ships
in the Arabian Sea, leapfrogging over Pakistani territory at night (to minimize
political difficulties for the government of President Pervez Musharraf) and
flying 400 miles inland to what became known as Camp Rhino. Their subsequent
resupply needs were largely met using Pakistani bases. Once deployed, they
began to interdict some road traffic and carry out support missions for special
operations forces.
Meanwhile, Pashtun tribes had begun to oppose the Taliban openly. By November,
they were accepting the help of U.S. special forces, who had previously been
active principally in the north of the country. Two groups in particular --
one led by Hamid Karzai, the other by another tribal leader, Gul Agha Shirzai
-- closed in on Kandahar. Mullah Omar offered to surrender in early December
but in the end fled with most of his fighters, leaving the city open by
December 8-9. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance, each with hundreds
of fighters or more, remained in areas near Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar,
and possibly elsewhere, but the Taliban no longer held cities or major
transportation routes.
Why this part of the campaign achieved such a rapid and radical victory remains
unclear. Taliban forces presumably could have held out longer if they had
hunkered down in the cities and put weapons near mosques, hospitals, and homes,
making their arsenal hard to attack from the air. Opposition fighters were too
few to defeat them in street-to-street fighting in most places, and starving
out the Taliban would have required the unthinkable tactic of starving local
civilian populations as well.
Most likely, the Taliban got caught in positions outside major cities that they
could neither easily escape nor defend. Once the Afghan opposition began to
engage the enemy seriously in November and Taliban forces returned fire, they
revealed their positions to American special operations personnel who could
call in devastating air strikes. Sometimes they were tricked into revealing
their locations over the radio. Even trench lines were poor defenses against
2-ton bombs delivered within 10 to 15 meters of their targets. Just what
Taliban fighters could have done differently, once stranded in that open
terrain, is unclear. They might have been better advised either to go on the
offensive or to try to escape back into urban settings under cover of night or
poor weather, although many U.S. reconnaissance assets work well under such
conditions. But both approaches would have been difficult and dangerous,
especially for a relatively unsophisticated military force such as the
Taliban.
The third main phase of the war began in early December. By this time, U.S.
intelligence had finally pinpointed much of al Qaeda's strength near Jalalabad,
in eastern Afghanistan. In particular, al Qaeda forces, including Osama bin
Laden, were supposedly holed up in the mountain redoubts of Tora Bora.
Traveling with perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 foreign fighters, most of them fellow
Arabs, bin Laden could not easily evade detection from curious eyes even if he
might elude U.S. overhead reconnaissance. Thus, once Afghan opposition
fighters, together with CIA and special operations forces, were deployed in the
vicinity, U.S. air strikes against the caves could become quite effective. By
mid-December, the fight for Tora Bora was over. Most significant cave openings
were destroyed and virtually all signs of live al Qaeda fighters disappeared.
Sporadic bombing continued in the area, and it was not until mid-January that a
major al Qaeda training base, Zawar Kili, was destroyed. But most bombing
ended by late 2001.
So why did bin Laden and other top al Qaeda leaders apparently get away? The
United States relied too much on Pakistan and its Afghan allies to close off
possible escape routes from the Tora Bora region. It is not clear that these
allies had the same incentives as the United States to conduct the effort with
dogged persistence. Moreover, the mission was inherently difficult. By
mid-December, the Pentagon felt considerably less sure than it had been of the
likely whereabouts of bin Laden, even though it suspected that he and most of
his top lieutenants were still alive.
Although estimates remain rough, Taliban losses in the war were considerable.
According to New York Times correspondent Nicholas Kristof, as many as
8,000 to 12,000 were killed -- roughly 20 percent of the Taliban's initial
fighting capability. Assuming conservatively at least two wounded for every
person killed, Taliban losses could have represented half their initial
fighting strength, a point at which most armies have traditionally started to
crumble. Another 7,000 or more were taken prisoner. Kristof's tally also
suggests that Afghan civilian casualties totaled only about 1,000, a mercifully
low number despite several wrongly targeted U.S. bombings and raids during the
war. Although a couple of those U.S. mistakes probably should have been
prevented, they do not change the basic conclusion that the war caused
relatively modest harm to innocents.
U.S. forces had lost about 30 personnel by the middle of March: about a dozen
on the battlefield (8 during Operation Anaconda) and the rest in and around
Afghanistan through accidents. Most were Marine Corps and Army troops, but
other personnel were lost as well, including a CIA operative. The casualty
total was 50 percent greater than those of the invasions of Grenada and Haiti
in the 1980s but less than the number of troops killed in Somalia in
1992-93.
On the whole, Operation Enduring Freedom has been masterful in both design and
execution. Using specially equipped CIA teams and special operations forces in
tandem with precision-strike aircraft allowed for accurate and effective
bombing of Taliban and al Qaeda positions. U.S. personnel also contributed
immensely to helping the Northern Alliance tactically and logistically. By
early November, the strategy had produced mass Taliban retreats in the north of
the country; it had probably caused many Taliban casualties as well.
More notably, the U.S. effort helped quickly galvanize Pashtun forces to
organize and fight effectively against the Taliban in the south, which many
analysts had considered a highly risky proposition and CENTCOM had itself
considered far from certain. Had these Pashtun forces decided that they feared
the Northern Alliance and the United States more than the Taliban, Afghanistan
might have become effectively partitioned, with al Qaeda taking refuge
exclusively in the south and the war effort rendered largely futile.
Convincing these Pashtun to change sides and fight against the Taliban required
just the right mix of diplomacy, military momentum and finesse, and battlefield
assistance from CIA and special operations teams.
Yet despite the overall accomplishments, mistakes were made. The Pentagon's
handling of the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was one
of them. Whether these men should have been designated as prisoners of war can
be debated. Neither group fought for a recognized government, and al Qaeda
fighters satisfied virtually none of the standard criteria associated with
soldiers. The Bush administration's decision not to designate the detainees as
POWS is thus understandable, particularly since it did not want to be forced to
repatriate them once hostilities in Afghanistan ended. But it probably would
have been wiser to accord the detainees POW rights initially, until a military
tribunal could determine them ineligible for POW status, as the Geneva
Conventions stipulate.
The POW issue aside, the administration's initial reluctance to guarantee the
basic protections of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban soldiers and its
continued refusal to apply them to al Qaeda were unwise. These decisions
fostered the impression that the detainees were not being treated humanely.
This perception was wrong, but it became prevalent. Rumsfeld had to go on the
defensive after photos circulated around the world showing shackled prisoners
kneeling before their open-air cells; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General
Richard Myers talked somewhat hyperbolically about how the detainees might gnaw
through hydraulic cables on airplanes if not forcibly restrained; and some
Pentagon officials even suggested that the detainees did not necessarily
deserve Geneva treatment, given the crimes of al Qaeda on September 11. But
Rumsfeld's comments came too late, and America's image in the Arab world in
particular took another hit.
The big U.S. mistake, however, concerned the hunt for top al Qaeda leaders. If
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Zubaydah, and other top al Qaeda
officials are found to have survived, the war will have failed to achieve a top
objective. Rather than relying on Afghan and Pakistani forces to do the job in
December near Tora Bora, Rumsfeld and Franks should have tried to prevent al
Qaeda fighters from fleeing into Pakistan by deploying American forces on or
near the border. U.S. troops should also have been used in the pursuit of
Mullah Omar and remnants of the Taliban, even though this mission was less
important than the one against al Qaeda leaders.
Admittedly, there were good reasons not to put many Americans in Afghanistan.
First, Washington feared a possible anti-American backlash, as Rumsfeld made
clear in public comments. Complicating matters, the United States would have
had a hard time getting many tens of thousands of troops into Afghanistan,
since no neighboring country except Pakistan would have been a viable staging
base -- and Pakistan was not willing to play that role.
But even though Rumsfeld's reasoning was correct in general, it was wrong for
Tora Bora. Putting several thousand U.S. forces in that mountainous, inland
region would have been difficult and dangerous. Yet given the enormity of the
stakes in this war, it would have been appropriate. Indeed, CENTCOM made
preparations for doing so. But in the end, partly because of logistical
challenges but perhaps partly because of the Pentagon's aversion to casualties,
the idea was dropped. It is supremely ironic that a tough-on-defense
Republican administration fighting for vital national security interests
appeared almost as reluctant to risk American lives in combat as the Clinton
administration had been in humanitarian missions -- at least until Operation
Anaconda, when it may have been largely too late.
Furthermore, local U.S. allies were just not up to the job in Tora Bora.
Pakistan deployed about 4,000 regular army forces along the border itself. But
they were not always fully committed to the mission, and there were too few
well-equipped troops to prevent al Qaeda and Taliban fighters from outflanking
them, as many hundreds of enemy personnel appear to have done. Afghan
opposition forces were also less than fully committed, and they were not very
proficient in fighting at night.
What would have been needed for the United States to perform this mission? To
close off the 100 to 150 escape routes along the 25-mile stretch of the
Afghan-Pakistani border closest to Tora Bora would have required perhaps, 1,000
to 3,000 American troops. Deploying such a force from the United States would
have required several hundred airlift flights, followed by ferrying the troops
and supplies to frontline positions via helicopter. According to CENTCOM, a
new airfield might have had to be created, largely for delivering fuel. Such
an operation would have taken a week or more. But two Marine Corps units with
more than 1,000 personnel were already in the country in December and were
somewhat idle at that time. If redeployed to Tora Bora, they could have helped
prevent al Qaeda's escape themselves. They also could have been reinforced
over subsequent days and weeks by Army light forces or more marines, who could
have closed off possible escape routes into the interior of Afghanistan. Such
an effort would not have assured success, but the odds would have favored the
United States.
How much does it matter if bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and their cohorts go free?
Even with its top leaders presumably alive, al Qaeda is weaker without its
Afghan sanctuary. It has lost training bases, secure meeting sites, weapons
production and storage facilities, and protection from the host-country
government. But as terrorism expert Paul Pillar has pointed out, the history
of violent organizations with charismatic leaders, such as the Shining Path in
Peru and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, suggests that they are
far stronger with their leaders than without them. The imprisonment of Abimael
Guzman in 1992 and Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 did much to hurt those
organizations, just as the 1995 assassination of Fathi Shikaki of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad weakened that group significantly. Some groups may
survive the loss of an important leader or become more violent as a result --
for example, Hamas flourished after the Israelis killed "the Engineer" Yahya
Ayyash in 1996. But even they may have a hard time coming up with new tactics
and concepts of operations after such a loss.
If bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other top al Qaeda leaders continue to evade
capture, they may have to spend the rest of their lives on the run. And their
access to finances may be sharply curtailed. But they could still inspire
followers and design future terrorist attacks. If successful, their escape
would be a major setback.
Even though advocates of the famous "revolution in military affairs" have
generally felt frustrated over the past decade, a number of important military
innovations appeared in Operation Enduring Freedom. They may not be as
revolutionary as blitzkrieg, aircraft-carrier war, and nuclear weapons, but
they are impressive nonetheless. Advocates of radical change have tended to
underestimate the degree to which the U.S. military can and does innovate even
without dramatic transformation.
Several developments were particularly notable. First, there was the
widespread deployment of special operations forces with laser rangefinders and
GPS devices to call in extremely precise air strikes. Ground spotters have
appeared in the annals of warfare for as long as airplanes themselves, but this
was the first time they were frequently able to provide targeting information
accurate to within several meters and do so quickly.
Second, U.S. reconnaissance capabilities showed real improvement. Unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVS), together with imaging satellites and JSTARS, maintained
frequent surveillance of much of the battlefield and continuous coverage of
certain specific sites -- providing a capability that General Myers described
as "persistence."
Also notable were advances in battlefield communications. The networks
established between UAVS, satellites, combat aircraft, and command centers were
faster than in any previous war, making "persistence" even more valuable. The
networks were not always fast enough, especially when the political leadership
needed to intercede in specific targeting decisions. Nor were they available
for all combat aircraft in the theater; for example, the Air Force's "Link 16"
data links are not yet installed on many strike aircraft. But they did often
reduce the time between detecting a target and destroying it to less than 20
minutes.
Perhaps most historic was the use of CIA-owned Predator UAVS to drop weapons on
ground targets. Aside from cruise missiles, this was the first time in warfare
that an unmanned aircraft had dropped bombs in combat, in the form of
"Hellfire" air-to-ground missiles. There were also further milestones in the
realm of precision weapons, which for the first time in major warfare
constituted the majority of bombs dropped. They were dropped from a wide range
of aircraft, including carrier-based jets, ground-based attack aircraft, and
B-52 as well as B-1 bombers. The bombers were used effectively as close-air
support platforms, loitering over the battlefield for hours until targets could
be identified. They delivered about 70 percent of the war's total ordnance.
In addition to the laser-guided bomb, the weapon of choice for the United
States quickly became the joint direct attack munition (JDAM). First used in
Kosovo, it is a one-ton iron bomb furnished with a $20,000 kit that helps steer
it to within 10 to 15 meters of its target using GPS and inertial guidance. It
is not quite as accurate as a laser-guided bomb but is much more resistant to
the effects of weather. In the Kosovo war, only the B-2 could deliver it, but
now the JDAM can be dropped by most U.S. attack aircraft. By the end of
January, the United States had dropped more than 4,000 laser-guided bombs and
more than 4,000 JDAMS as well.
Other ordnance was also important. Up to 1,000 cluster bombs were used, with
accuracy of about 30 meters once outfitted with a wind-correcting mechanism.
Although controversial because of their dud rate, cluster bombs were
devastating against Taliban and al Qaeda troops unlucky enough to be caught in
the open. A number of special-purpose munitions were used in smaller numbers,
including cave-busting munitions equipped with nickel-cobalt steel-alloy tips
and special software; these could penetrate up to 10 feet of rock or 100 feet
of soil.
The ability to deliver most U.S. combat punch from the air kept the costs of
war relatively modest. Through January 8, the total had reached $3.8 billion,
while the military costs of homeland security efforts in the United States had
reached $2.6 billion. The bills in Afghanistan included $1.9 billion for
deploying troops, $400 million for munitions, $400 million for replacing
damaged or destroyed equipment, and about $1 billion for fuel and other
operating costs.
What broad lessons emerge from this conflict? First, military progress does
not always depend on highly expensive weapons platforms. Many important
contemporary trends in military technology and tactics concern information
networks and munitions more than aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles. To take
an extreme example, B-52 bombers with JDAM were more useful in Operation
Enduring Freedom than were the stealthy B-2s. Second, human skills remain
important in war, as demonstrated best by the performance of special operations
forces and CIA personnel. The basic infantry skills, foreign language
abilities, competence and care in using and maintaining equipment, and physical
and mental toughness of U.S. troops contributed to victory every bit as much as
did high-tech weaponry.
Third, military mobility and deployability should continue to be improved. The
Marine Corps did execute an impressive ship-to-objective maneuver, forgoing the
usual ship-to-shore operation and moving 400 miles inland directly. But most
part of the Army still cannot move so quickly and smoothly. Part of the
solution may be the Army's long-term plans for new and lighter combat
equipment. (The Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft may be useful,
too, at least in modest numbers and once proven safe.) But the Army could also
emulate the Marine Corps' organization, training, and logistics where possible
-- and soon. The task is hardly hopeless; Army forces were tactically quite
mobile and impressive in Operation Anaconda.
Finally, the war showed that more joint-service experimentation and innovation
are highly desirable, given that the synergies between special operations
forces on the ground and Air Force and Navy aircraft in the skies were perhaps
the most important keys to victory.
How do these lessons match up with the Bush administration's Quadrennial
Defense Review of September 30, 2001, and its long-term budget plan of February
4, 2002? The administration has basically preserved the force structure and
weapons modernization plan that it inherited from the Clinton administration,
added missile defense and one or two other priorities -- and thrown very large
sums of money into the budget. The Bush administration envisions a national
security budget (Pentagon spending plus nuclear weapons budgets for the
Department of Energy) that will grow to $396 billion in 2003 and $470 billion
in 2007. (It was $300 billion when Bush took office and is $350 billion in
2002.) The war on terrorism cannot explain this growth; its annual costs are
currently expected to be less than $10 billion after 2003. That $470 billion
figure for 2007 is a whopping $100 billion more than the Clinton administration
envisioned for the same year in its last budget plan.
For many critics who tend to focus on weapons procurement, the problem with
Bush's plan is that it protects the traditional weapons priorities of the
military services without seeking a radical enough transformation of the U.S.
armed forces. But this common criticism is only half right. The Bush
administration has an aggressive program for so-called defense transformation,
principally in research, development, and experimentation, where it envisions
spending an additional $100 billion between 2002 and 2007. If anything, these
plans are slightly too generous and ambitious.
In fact, the problem is the traditional one: the unwillingness to set
priorities and to challenge the military services to do so as well, especially
in the procurement accounts. Despite the lack of a superpower rival, the
administration proposes replacing most major combat systems with systems often
costing twice as much, and doing so throughout the force structure. This plan
would drive up the procurement budget to $99 billion by 2007 from its present
level of $60 billion.
A more prudent modernization agenda would begin by canceling at least one or
two major weapons, such as the Army's Crusader artillery system. But the more
important change in philosophy would be to modernize more selectively in
general. Only a modest fraction of the armed forces need to be equipped with
the most sophisticated and expensive weaponry. That high-end or "silver
bullet" force would be a hedge against possible developments such as a rapidly
modernizing Chinese military. The rest of the force should be equipped
primarily with relatively inexpensive, but highly capable, existing weaponry
carrying better sensors, munitions, computers, and communications systems. For
example, rather than purchase 3,000 joint-strike fighters, the military would
buy only 1,000 of those and then add aircraft such as new F-16 Block 60
fighters to fill out its force structure.
Other parts of the proposed Bush plan deserve scrutiny, too. After several
successive years of increases, military pay is now in fairly good shape. In
most cases, compensation is no longer poor by comparison with private-sector
employment; as such, the administration's plans for further large increases go
too far. The proposed research and development budgets, meanwhile, exceed the
already hefty increases promised by Bush during his presidential campaign;
given that research and development were not severely cut during the 1990s,
such growth seems excessive now. Finally, the Pentagon needs to reform the way
it provides basic services such as military health care, housing, and various
base operations. Unfortunately, if budgets get too big, the Pentagon's
incentives to look for efficiencies often weaken. On balance, the planned
increases in defense spending are roughly twice as much as necessary for the
years ahead.
A final assessment of Operation Enduring Freedom depends on whether bin Laden
and his top lieutenants have escaped Afghanistan. It could be a while before
anyone knows; indeed, Rumsfeld has speculated that U.S. troops could remain in
Afghanistan into 2003. A verdict will also have to await a better sense of
where Afghanistan is headed. Whatever the stability of the post-Taliban
government, it is doubtful that the Taliban and al Qaeda will ever control
large swaths of the country again. But if pockets of terrorists remain in the
country, or if Afghanistan again descends into civil war, the victory will be
incomplete. In the former case, Afghanistan could still be an important if
diminished asset for al Qaeda; in the latter, the U.S. image throughout the
Islamic world may take another blow as critics find more fuel for their claims
that Americans care little about the fate of Muslim peoples.
To prevent such outcomes, Washington needs to work hard with other donors to
make reconstruction and aid programs succeed in Afghanistan. The Bush
administration also needs to rethink its policy on peacekeeping. Its current
unwillingness to contribute to a stability force for Afghanistan is a major
mistake that U.S. allies may not be able to redress entirely on their own. A
force of 20,000 to 30,000 troops is clearly needed for the country as a whole;
several thousand troops in Kabul will probably not suffice.
That said, the situation in Afghanistan has improved enormously since October 7
-- and so has U.S. security. The Afghan resistance, the Bush administration,
its international coalition partners, the U.S. armed forces, and the CIA have
accomplished what will likely be remembered as one of the greater military
successes of the twenty-first century.
Reprinted by permission from Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002. Copyright
2002 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. |
[1] Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At
Camp David, Advise and Dissent," The Washington Post, January 31, 2002,
p. A1; Bill Keller, "The World According to Powell," The New York Times
Magazine, November 25, 2001, pp. 61-62.
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